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THE PRINCIPALITY OF SEALAND, AND ITS CASE FOR
SOVEREIGN RECOGNITION
INTRODUCTION
The Principality of Sealand is a small platform, a remnant of World War II
British defenses, occupied by a billionaire visionary whose attempts at selfdetermination have been hindered around every corner. The argument for
Sealand’s sovereignty is about more than the future of the platform-nation. It is
about the international legal community’s acceptance of the changing world,
and the necessity of adapting certain terms and ideologies to grow alongside
our changing planet. Complaints disfavoring Sealand’s statehood claims range
from its man-made nature, its lack of a recognizable citizenry, and England’s
de jure ownership of the territorial sea in which Sealand resides. These
complaints are backed by scholarship, and neighboring nations allege that
various judicial opinions support their stance. However, with the changing
landscape of international law comes the inevitable recognition of Sealand’s
sovereignty, or at least the claims of small, artificially constructed future
nations in a similar setting. The argument for Sealand is the argument for the
adaptation of international legal norms, and the evolving meaning of
“sovereignty” on an international scale.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF SEALAND
Sealand’s evolution through time is as philosophical as it is physical. The
platform, sitting a few miles off the southeast coast of England, was originally
constructed to defend England’s sovereignty.1 The British government erected
this platform as a form of military defense to German naval forces during
World War II.2 As time went on, the British military abandoned the platform
and left it to rust in the English Channel.3 Once discovered by fishing-magnate
Roy Bates, the physical structure adopted a new purpose, family home and
territory of a fledgling nation.4 The physical evolution forced onto the seadwelling structure by its inhabitants is analogous to the disputed legal status it
1
2
3
4

About Sealand, SEALAND, http://www.sealandgov.org/about (last visited Oct. 30, 2014).
History of Sealand, SEALAND, http://www.sealandgov.org/about (last visited Oct. 30, 2014).
SEALAND, supra note 1.
Id.
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held in the international legal theater. This section will discuss the historical
underpinnings of the material construction itself, as well as illustrate the logic
behind some of the original historical events that the founding father of
Sealand utilized in his pioneering arguments for sovereign recognition from
the international community.
A. History of Fort Roughs
To understand the complexities of categorizing Sealand’s sovereign status,
it is important to first understand the history of the platform itself. The origins
of the idea for the platform found inspiration in the old Martello Towers of the
coastal United Kingdom.5 Martello Towers, named after a round fortress at
Mortella Point in Corsica, Spain, surround the coast of the United Kingdom.6
After two British naval ships spent two days attacking the tower at Mortella
Point, the British navy utilized the squat, round design and incorporated it into
over one hundred forty brick and mortar Martello Towers from Scotland down
to East Sussex.7 Dating back to the Napoleonic Wars, the Martello Towers
helped form the architectural basis for a group of forts designed to protect
southeast England in another altercation, World War II.8
During World War II, Commander E.C. Shankland, Port of London
Harbour Master, sought advice on a series of forts to protect and defend
mainland England.9 Fearing harmful shipping losses in the Thames Estuary,
especially from German magnetic mines, Commander Shankland
commissioned Guy Maunsell to build a series of naval forts to defend the
area.10 To protect the busiest port in the world, Maunsell designed “a small
defensive fort that rested on the sea bed but rose above water level, with a
flooded-pontoon foundation and citadel superstructure.”11 Maunsell
proclaimed “speed of construction, ease of transport and centralisation of
manufacture are the fundamental factors,” and subsequently built what are now

5 Guy Maunsell, World War II: Sea Forts + Harbours, ENGINEERING TIMELINES, http://www.
engineering-timelines.com/who/Maunsell_G/maunsellGuy5.asp (last visited Sept. 26, 2013).
6 Martello Towers, GEOGRAPH, http://www.geograph.org.uk/article/Martello-Towers (last visited Oct.
28, 2013).
7 Id.
8 Maunsell, supra note 5.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Navy Sea Forts, Thames Estuary, ENGINEERING TIMELINES, http://www.engineering-timelines.com/
scripts/engineeringItem.asp?id=1168 (last visited Sept. 26, 2013) (explaining that the platform measures 51.2m
long, 26.8m wide and 4.3m deep).
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known as the “Maunsell Forts.”12 The Maunsell Forts are similar to Martello
Towers in that they both support a parapet platform from which firearms may
be launched with 360-degree potential exposure atop stalwart bases
encapsulating living quarters and storage.13 Unlike Martello Towers, which are
built on coastal land, Maunsell Forts rest upon two robust towers anchored in
the sea floor exposing little of the pedestal, while still placing the platforms at
a strategically favorable position above ships and magnetic mines.14 The
British found so much success using the Maunsell Fort-system of flooding the
platforms to root them in the seabed during World War II that they again used
the same design in the Mulberry Harbours, the D-Day landings at Normandy.15
Of the four Maunsell Forts, only two remain standing, Knock John and
Roughs, or Fort Roughs.16 Between the two last standing forts, only Fort
Roughs still sits in international waters, and the Bates family from Southend
has occupied it since December 24, 1966.17 The Bates family eventually named
Fort Roughs “The Principality of Sealand.”18
Following World War II, the British Navy decommissioned all of the forts
between 1945 and 1958, including Fort Roughs.19 Located approximately
seven nautical miles off the coast of England, Fort Roughs “was apparently not
torn down because, being located in international waters, the British
Government could abdicate responsibility and avoid the expense of tearing it
down.”20
B. Introduction of Roy Bates
In 1965, a fishing-magnate billionaire named Roy Bates began searching
for a radio broadcast station, a hub from which he could launch an illegal radio
program.21 Initially, Bates intended to occupy the seemingly abandoned
platform Lock John in order to accommodate his pirate radio station, Radio
12 Maunsell, supra note 5 (explaining that the British Navy ended up building four Maunsell forts: HM
Forts Roughs Tower, Sunk Head Tower, Tongue Sands and Knock John).
13 Martello Towers, supra note 6; Navy Sea Forts, supra note 11.
14 Navy Sea Forts, supra note 11.
15 Id.
16 Maunsell, supra note 5.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Trevor A. Dennis, The Principality of Sealand: Nation Building by Individuals, 10 TULSA J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 261, 263 (2002).
21 Grant Hibberd, The Last Great Adventure of the Twentieth Century: The Sealand Affair in British
Diplomacy, 4 BRITAIN AND THE WORLD 269, 270 (2011).
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Essex.22 After being issued a summons from British authorities for operating a
transmitter within the three nautical mile limit of England, he set out in search
of a more international, unclaimed venue.23 In 1966, Bates and his son Michael
occupied Fort Roughs, the Maunsell Fort located six nautical miles off the
coast of England, in international waters.24 For a while, Bates broadcasted his
of-the-time outlawed 1960’s rock jams to mainland England, and successfully
evaded the wrath of British authorities.25 Although his initial success garnered
him some degree of notoriety, Britain’s legalization of commercial radio
programs necessitated a shift in focus for the entrepreneurially minded Bates.26
With a radio station no longer considered avant-garde due to the liberalization
of British radio policy, Bates’ research on the property of Fort Roughs yielded
what he considered the next logical, if not peculiar, step: to declare
independence.27
C. Declaration of Sovereignty
With the new goal of sovereign independence in mind, Roy Bates began
laying the foundation for his platform-nation. Bates realized that his current
home lay roughly seven nautical miles off the coast of England,28 which, in
1967, meant outside of the United Kingdom’s territorial waters.29 Luckily for
Roy Bates, the United Kingdom’s desire to avoid the small cost of tearing
down the platform at the end of World War II meant there was neither an
inhabitant of the island, nor a nation willing to claim ownership over it.30
Bates, the pioneer that he was, felt he could declare independence and create
his own nation.31 The opportunity for commercialization of his sea island
presented itself, and Bates seized.32 The United Kingdom’s trash was Roy
Bates’ sovereign nation. Without wasting any time, Roy Bates established
himself as principal and Sovereign; based the Law of Sealand on British
common law and British law of contract; created a national flag; issued
22

Id. at 270.
Id.
24 Id.
25 Another Country, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 11, 2001), http://www.npr.org/programs/wesat/features/
2001/sealand/081101.sealand.html.
26 Id.
27 Hibberd, supra note 21, at 270.
28 SEALAND, supra note 1.
29 Hibberd, supra note 21, at 281.
30 SEALAND, supra note 1.
31 Dennis, supra note 20.
32 Another Country, supra note 25.
23
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currency based on the U.S. Dollar; and began issuing passports and stamps in
1969.33 The country even has a national anthem.34 Bates wrote the nation’s
motto, “E Mare Libertas,” or “From the Sea, Freedom.”35 Bates lived in
Sealand with his wife, Joan, the declared princess, and his children, Michael
and Penelope.36
Although Bates declared sovereignty, his island nation’s jurisdictional and
legal status remained untested until May 6, 1968.37 Following occasional coast
guard harassment upon their new Principality, Bates and his son are said to
have fired some sort of weapon towards a government vessel in order to defend
their territory.38 Upon their next visit to the mainland, Bates and his son were
arrested and given a summons to appear in court.39 In a complaint against
Bates and his son, the Crown alleged that the two possessed a .22 pistol and
endangered the lives of others, thereby putting them in breach of Section 22 of
the Firearms Act, 193740 (“Penalty for possessing firearms with intent to
injure.”).41 It was further alleged that Bates and his wife were in possession of
the firearm without a permit, while inside the jurisdiction of Essex Assizes.42
Justice Chapman, presiding over the case, acknowledged the prosecutions
argument in his judgment,43 but ultimately dismissed the three charges because
they took place “outside the jurisdiction of the English Courts.”44 Summarizing
his judgment, Justice Chapman concluded, “[b]reaches of its provisions, even
by British subjects, outside those limits are not in my judgment intended to be

33

SEALAND, supra note 1.
PRINCIPALITY OF SEALAND NATIONAL ANTHEM, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M5OMsdlsoOM
(last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
35 The Pirate Prince of Sealand, Remembered, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 13, 2012), http://www.npr.org/
2012/10/13/162847229/remembering-paddy-roy-bates-prince-of-sealand.
36 Hibberd, supra note 22, at 270.
37 Transcript of Court Decision, Regina v. Paddy Roy Bates, Shire Hall, Chelmsford (Oct. 25, 1968).
38 James Grimmelmann, Sealand and HavenCo Part I: The History of Sealand, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Feb. 14, 2011, 8:46 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2011/02/14/sealand-and-havenco-part-i-thehistory-of-sealand/.
39 Id.
40 Transcript of Court Decision, supra note 37.
41 Firearms Act, 1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, c. 12, § 22 (1937) (U.K.).
42 Transcript of Court Decision, supra note 37.
43 Prosecution’s argument was based on the “Offenses at Sea Act, 1536 which first gave Common Law
Courts power to deal with ‘all treason, felonies, robberies, murders, and confederacies here after to be
committed in or upon the sea (i.e. the High Seas, see Leigh v. Burly 1609 Owen 122) or in any other haven,
river, creek, or place where the Admiral or Admirals have or pretend to have power, authority, or
jurisdiction.’” Transcript of Court Decision, supra note 37.
44 Id.
34
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cogniable [sic] by the British Court.”45 Bates understood the lack of
jurisdiction as permission to continue settling his Principality, perhaps as a
reaffirmation of his sovereign declarations. The ordeal even gained recognition
in a House of Lords debate when Lord Goronwy-Roberts reported, “I
understand that in 1968 there was a case which . . . could not be pursued since
at the time of the incident then in question—which took place on Rough’s
Tower—the defendant was held to be outside the area of the court’s
geographical jurisdiction.”46
The Principality of Sealand experienced another quasi-violent encounter in
1977, again the outcome of which supplying sustenance to the idea that Bates
had truly established a sovereign nation.47 A potential business opportunity
presented itself to Roy and Joan Bates in the form of German and Dutch
diamond merchants.48 After traveling all the way to Austria, the couple
realized they may have been duped, and began calling friends who worked on
docks and ships near Sealand.49 When a friend told the couple that he had seen
a large helicopter hovering over Sealand, the Bates’ fears were confirmed.50 In
the elder Bates’ absence, Michael Bates had been tricked into letting several
men board Sealand, resulting in his capture and imprisonment within the
platform for three days.51 Reclaiming what Roy Bates believed to be his
rightful sovereign nation, he descended upon the platform-nation via
helicopter, wielding shotguns, and taking the country back by force.52 After
imprisoning the traitors—one of whom was a dual-citizen of Sealand and
Germany—and holding trials for treason, Bates declared them prisoners.53
When one prisoner’s wife reached out to the German Embassy in London, the
embassy sent a lawyer to Sealand to investigate.54 In stride, Roy Bates took the
German “Ambassador’s” visit as Germany’s recognition of Sealand as a
sovereign nation.55 Again, the House of Lords debate hosted commentary on
the events when Lord Kennet asked, “is it not the case that the British national
45

Id.
397 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th Ser.) (198) 4–7 (U.K.).
47 Simson Garfinkel, Welcome to Sealand. Now Bugger Off., WIRED, (July 2000), available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.07/haven-pr.html.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Grimmelmann, supra note 38.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
46

LYON GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

1/22/2015 12:31 PM

THE PRINCIPALITY OF SEALAND

643

on this tower has been reported in the Press as having taken actions which, if
they had been committed in a place where there was jurisdiction, would have
been crimes; but that as there is no jurisdiction on this tower no action has been
taken to restrain him . . . ?”56
II. HISTORY OF SOVEREIGNTY
This section discusses the philosophical arguments for the recognition of
Sealand’s sovereignty. Additionally, this section develops the notion of
sovereignty as a philosophical argument. The term sovereignty has matured
into a more practical, uniformly understood term of art in the legal sphere in
modern times, but the idea began as a much simpler concept. Jean-Jacques
Rousseau’s The Social Contract explores the natural inkling toward
independent authority and the coalescence of certain social bonds.
Additionally, American President Woodrow Wilson has spoken on the issue of
sovereignty, and in comparison to colonialism.
The concept of sovereignty is by no means a modern philosophy, and
Sealand is not unique in its desire to govern its own community. Jean-Jacques
Rousseau posited the origins of sovereignty in his thoughts on The Social
Contract.57 He surmised a man circumscribing an area of the ground, and
saying, “this is mine.”58 Undoubtedly, the term sovereignty has come a long
way to its current definition of “a person, body, or state vested with
independent and supreme authority.”59 With a notion so simple as declaring
ownership over land, and as importantly convincing others of this ownership,
Rousseau dubs a “real founder of civil society.”60 The social contract describes
man’s first feelings, and how they developed from the most basic of instincts
into competition for resources.61 These evolutions of character, Rousseau
wrote, are how humans forgot “that the fruits of the earth belong equally to us
all, and the earth itself to nobody!”62
Sovereignty developed as a means to declare ownership over the resources
we preferred. The further development of preferences and priorities led people
56

05 Dec. 1978, 397 PARL. DEB., H.L. (1978) 4–7 (U.K.).
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE FIRST
(Yale U. Press 2002).
58 Id.
59 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1523 (9th ed. 2009).
60 ROUSSEAU, supra note 57, at 113.
61 Id. at 114.
62 Id. at 113.
57

AND

SECOND DISCOURSES 113

LYON GALLEYSPROOFS2

644

1/22/2015 12:31 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

to “gradually flock together, coalesce into several separate bodies, and at
length form in every country a distinct nation, united in character and manners,
not by any laws or regulations, but by the same way of life, and alimentation,
and the common influence of the climate.”63 At the beginning of civil society,
human beings were not bound to each other by codified statute and
constitutions, their similarities in personality, preferences, and priorities
cemented their communities. In fact, the differences in those groupings of
similarities are what created divergent societies from the beginning.64 It is the
differences in preference, the differences in will, that make the groups depart
from one another. It is also the differences in will that further solidify the
social bond between the members of any one group.65 As the groups began to
grow, the collective will within the groups would grow more diverse, and split
again. The development of the will within these groups began to be their
defining characteristics, and as Rousseau suggests, “sovereignty, being nothing
but the exercise of the general will, can never be alienated, and that the
sovereign power, which is in fact a collective being, can be represented only by
itself.”66 It is important to note that the general will of a sovereign need not be
unanimous, but rather must count the “vote” of each member in order to be
defined as general.67 The sovereign, by definition, contained only the
commonality of will, as opposed to defined land boundaries.68
Rousseau describes the fuel of a sovereign as the social pact of the
inhabitants: “As nature gives every man an absolute power over all his limbs,
the social pact gives the body politic absolute power over all its members; and
it is this same power which, when controlled by the general will, bears, as I
said, the same of sovereignty.”69 Projecting an image of sovereignty that seems
as natural as mankind’s most basic instincts, Rousseau discusses the issue as if
it were a right, an entitlement owed to everyone who is capable of exercising
their will. More importantly, the highly adaptable concept of sovereignty has
“survived many premature obituaries, and the charge that it stands in the way
of a system of international governance.”70 Sovereignty, to that end, is not an

63

Id. at 118.
Id. at 170 (explaining that which is common to these different interests forms the social bond).
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 171.
68 Id. at 174.
69 Id. at 173–74.
70 Bardo Fassbender, Sovereignty and Constitutionalism in International Law, in SOVEREIGNTY
TRANSITION 115 (Neil Walker ed., 2003).
64
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impediment to international cooperation, but rather a guiding force
empowering groups of people, a legal concept that has “fostered the rise of the
modern state.”71
For Sealand, independence is a tool for prosperity rather than a weapon for
disobedience. The tiny would-be-nation wishes to employ sovereignty as its
natural right in order to represent the commonality of its will, to grant political
power to all of its members, and to exercise one of mankind’s most basic
instincts. On an ideological level, it is not simply that Sealand desires
sovereignty for sovereignty’s sake, but rather because sovereignty permits the
most basic of rights, and grants freedom from the enslavement of external
powers not well enough situated to exert that type of authority.
Similarly, in more modern times, President Woodrow Wilson spoke of
“transforming self-determination into a universal right” in his Fourteen Point
Address on January 8, 1918.72 Specifically touching on the dissolution of
colonialism, President Wilson went on to declare that a “free, open-minded,
and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict
observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of
sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight
with the equitable claims of government whose title is to be determined.”73 In
this instance, Sealand being the population concerned, the quest for sovereign
recognition deserves a level footing against the powers opposed to its claims
for independence. The free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment
of England’s colonial claim over Sealand requires an equal starting point in the
interest of sovereign equality. In terms of Sealand’s struggle, President Wilson
would have been in favor of Sealand’s arguments carrying weight equal to
those of established nations, and of the conversation moving towards the topic
of self-determination being viewed as a universal right. Clearly, living within a
different situation from traditional British Colonialism, Sealand’s contention is
analogously supported by the legal principle of equality, which is “so closely
connected with that of sovereignty that the fusion in the UN Charter of the two
terms into one (‘sovereign equality’, Art. 2(1)) suggested itself.”74 The
tradition of seeking sovereign recognition has been, generally, adopted by the
71

Id.
Robert Friedlander, Self-Determination: A Legal-Political Inquiry, DETROIT C. L. REV. 71, 73 (1975).
See President Woodrow Wilson, Address to a Joint Session of Congress (Jan. 8, 1918), in 45 THE PAPERS OF
WOODROW WILSON 534–39 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1984).
73 President Woodrow Wilson, supra note 72, at 537.
74 Fassbender, supra note 70, at 120.
72
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smaller states, and successful only when defended by larger ones.75
International popular opinion finally swayed in favor of smaller states with the
signing of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which “bade farewell to the
medieval conception of a society of states organized hierarchically, i.e., on the
basis of inequality.”76
In the Third Book of The Social Contract, Rousseau discusses government,
its principles, classifications, and limits.77 Delineating between democracy,78
where the sovereign entrusts the government to all or a majority of the people
aristocracy,79 where the sovereign restricts government to the hands of a small
number, and monarchy,80 where the sovereign concentrates the entirety of the
government into a single entity, Rousseau begins his explanation “That Not All
Forms of Government Are Suited to All Countries.”81 In explaining that
“liberty is not a fruit of every climate, it is not within the reach of all
peoples,”82 he is not advocating that liberty, as a concept, is not suitable for all,
he is purporting that the virtues and concepts of nations depend on their
inhabitants. He continues the culinary analogy to explain that the appetite and
variety of diet differs greatly between a German and an Italian, based on their
geographical differences.83 Rousseau promotes the idea that governmental
styles are not one-size-fits-all. Although he does advocate for the benefits of
certain gradations of “mixed government,” such as when a single leader has
subordinate magistrates that are representative of the people, he eventually
takes the stance that “there are natural causes on the basis of which one can
assign the form of government that the force of the climate requires . . . .”84
Rousseau’s Social Contract supports Sealand being a sovereign nation.
Allow the analogy of Roy Bates to Rousseau’s “real founder of civil society.”85
Bates found an unoccupied and unused area, abandoned by the British

75

Id.
Id. at 121.
77 See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF
INEQUALITY, DISCOURSE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 54–55 (Donald A. Cress ed., trans., Hackett Publ’g Co.
1983).
78 Id. at 54.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 55.
81 Id. at 63.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 65.
84 Id. at 64.
85 ROUSSEAU, supra note 58, at 113.
76
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government, and declared ownership over it.86 Above all others, at the time,
Roy Bates established his preference to this platform over all others, and
declared it a new nation, accompanied by constitutions, currency, passports,
among others.87 In creating a group of citizens bound together by their
preferences and priorities, Bates followed the Rousseau platform of
sovereignty by collecting those people who align with the general will. Sealand
also presented the opportunity for new government, one that suited the will of
the inhabitants, and one that realized its own priorities were not “the fruit of
every climate.” The commonality of will between those citizens of Sealand to
construct a new nation, while peculiar to pre-established nations, is exactly the
form of organic state growing that Rousseau explicates in The Social Contract.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SEALAND’S SOVEREIGNTY
For Sealand to be recognized on an international level, various international
legal principles and norms must be understood. Utilizing numerous United
Nations Conventions, the Montevideo Convention, and case law regarding
historical secession and independence movements, the case for Sealand’s
statehood grows stronger. When the United Nations drafted the Convention on
the Law of the Sea, the international legal community was simply not adept in
dealing with such a modern concept as artificial landmasses obtaining
sovereign recognition. The laws that emanated from the Convention on the
Law of the Sea are concerned with issues that do not apply in the case of
Sealand, but rather are focused on piracy, natural resource extraction, and
relatively arbitrary jurisdictional boundaries. No stranger to legal altercation,
Sealand’s advocates employ the experiences of the platform-nation as proof
that the assorted requirements, limitations, and qualifications for sovereignty
are fulfilled. This section explores the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea, and its codifications of international law with regards to Territorial
Sovereignty, the High Seas, and the Exclusive Economic Zones surrounding
coastal and island nations. In turn, the Montevideo Convention’s four
requirements for sovereignty are discussed in depth, and applied to the facts of
the Principality of Sealand to display the winning argument for its sovereignty.
Finally, the Secession of Quebec is dissected in order to analyze certain
arguments against Sealand’s sovereign claims, and finally used to bolster the
case for independence.

86
87

Dennis, supra note 20, at 263.
See generally SEALAND, http://www.sealandgov.org/terms-and-conditions (last visited Nov. 19, 2014).
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A. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
1. Territorial Sovereignty
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea dictates the
international legal view of territorial issues in the high seas.88 Part II,
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, specifically commands, “[t]he
sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal
waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an
adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea” in its general provisions.”89
This territorial sea, it continues, “[e]very State has the right to establish the
breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding twelve nautical miles,
measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention.”90
This means that established sovereign nations inherently own everything in
this “belt of sea” extending twelve nautical miles from its coast. The
Convention originally entered into force in 1982, when it replaced four preexisting treaties regarding the international law of the sea. This conference
changed the “traditional claims to a three-mile territorial sea” and ended up
rewriting the Convention to include a twelve nautical mile extension.91 The
debate over a three-mile territorial zone and a twelve-mile territorial zone dates
back to at least the 1800’s, particularly in British courts.92 In Regina v. Keyn, a
German merchant ship struck a British ship within three miles of the coast,
sinking it and drowning a woman on board.93 In deciding one question for the
court, “[h]ow far does this territory, or do these territorial waters, as they are
usually called, extend?” Sir R. Phillimore answered, “I am of opinion that the
Court had no jurisdiction . . . for an offense committed . . . within three miles
off the coast . . . .”94
More recently, the United Nations has discussed the issue of coastal
extensions of territorial sovereignty amongst its member states, particularly

88 See generally United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
89 Id. at 400.
90 Id.
91 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, A Historical Perspective, OCEANS AND LAWS
OF THE SEA, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_
perspective.htm#Historical%20Perspective (last visited Oct. 31, 2013).
92 The Queen v. Keyn, (1876) 2 Exch. Div. 63 (Eng.).
93 Id.
94 Id.
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with regards to this Convention.95 Since the Convention’s adoption in 1958,
the United Nations has held more than a dozen sessions focused on the
territorial sea, contiguous zones, continental shelves, exclusive economic
zones, and the international regimes of the seabed and ocean floor.96 Per
request of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General convened a Second
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, where specific issues of
territorial sovereignty were center stage.97 As a consequence of the sessions,
the participating member states adopted General Assembly resolution 2749,
Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor, and the
Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, “Recognizing that
the existing legal regime of the high seas does not provide substantive rules for
regulating the exploration of the aforesaid area and the exploitation of its
resources . . . .”98 The General Assembly’s resolution continues to declare the
deep seabed part of the “heritage of mankind,” which automatically excludes
declarations of sovereignty and national ownership over it.99 However, the
resolution fails to delineate the means by which a sovereign nation exerts
claims of ownership over territorial waters, thereby depriving states of the
ability to demarcate their property from that of the “common heritage”
enumerated above.100 Furthermore, the common heritage language of the
resolution is placed within the context of environmental concerns, explicitly
stating that the purpose of the resolution is to be “Mindful of the importance of
the Convention for the protection and preservation of the marine environment
and of the growing concern for the global environment.”101
From 1973 to 1982, 160 countries participated in drafting and adopting the
Convention on the Law of the Sea.102 The main issue of contention, and the
reason several countries have cited, as grounds for their refusal to ratify the
Convention were provisions related to deep seabed mining.103 From the
Convention’s drafting to its ratification, some countries have found issue with

95 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Procedural History, UNITED NATIONS
AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/uncls/uncls_ph_e.pdf.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 G.A. Res. 2749 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8097, at 24 (Dec. 17,
1970).
99 Id. at para. 1.
100 Id.
101 G.A. Res. 48/263, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/263 (Aug. 17, 1994).
102 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Procedural History, supra note 95.
103 Id.
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the distribution of sovereign territory, especially with regards to suggested
“common heritage” and resource allocation.104
Due to the murky waters of territorial sovereignty created by the United
Nations, the redrafted limitations of nautical boundaries has perplexed
centuries-old courts and modern international assemblies alike. It is not
surprising then, that Roy Bates’ court summons, for an alleged offense
approximately six miles off the coast, was dismissed almost one-hundred years
after the redrafting of territorial limitations.105 The expansion of territorial sea
from three to twelve nautical miles posed even more problems when freedom
of navigation through strategically critical straits became a concern.106
Although some nations began favoring the twelve-mile expansion, “extension
by many states of coastal state maritime zone jurisdiction to 12 miles
threatened to enclose within . . . territorial sea limits another 116 straits. The
three mile rule would have left a strip of high seas between them.”107 No
longer simply a jurisdictional issue, the expansion would have drastic
consequences because, “[f]reedom of navigation through several strategic
straits, such as the Dover Strait, the Strait of Gibraltar, the Bering Straits,
Babel-Mandeb, the Strait of Hormuz, became more precarious, because they
came under the coastal states’ problematic territorial sea jurisdiction and
discretion.”108 Even the United States initially pushed back against the original
extension for fear of diminished trade-route navigability: “The United States
made it clear time and time again that it would not accept any extension of the
territorial sea from three miles to twelve miles unless that right of free passage
through international straits was accepted.”109 At the heart of the issue existed
not an argument of sovereignty, but rather an argument of freedom of
navigation. Nations with strong naval presences desired less extended
territorial waters, since they held more confidence in their security than their
ability to trade on the water most efficiently.110 Conversely, nations more
concerned with their safety desired more extended territorial zones in order to
place a larger buffer between their precious coasts and the threat of a potential

104
105
106

Id.; G.A. Res. 2749, supra note 98.
Transcript of Court Decision, supra note 37.
R.P. Anand, Transit Passage and Overflight in International Straits, 26 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 72, 78

(1986).
107
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Id. at 89.
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Id. at 91.
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maritime attack.111 Surely, a country like Great Britain would have fallen into
the former category, wishing a smaller territorial-water zone in order to free up
trade routes, thus favoring the scheme that would place Sealand in
international, and therefore potentially sovereign, waters.
Bates’ original occupation and declaration of sovereignty of Sealand took
place in the 1960’s, thus capturing in time the widely accepted three-mile
territorial limits of Great Britain’s aquatic reach.112 When Bates originally
inhabited and publically decreed sovereignty, Sealand rested at Latitude 51.53
N, Longitude 01.28 E, or, roughly six miles from the coast of England.113
According to popular scholarship, “A treaty does not have retroactive effect so
as to bind a party with respect to any act or fact which took place, or any
situation which ceased to exist, before its entry into force for that party, unless
this is provided for in the treaty.”114 The UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea’s 12-mile territorial limit cannot retroactively encapsulate Fort Roughs,
and subsequently, Sealand. If the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea is to
be obeyed by all members of the United Nations—including the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland115—then it would stand to say
that Great Britain “shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state,”116 including the state of Sealand.
2. High Seas
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea deals with the High
Seas in great detail.117 Article 86 of the Convention dictates,
The provisions of this Part apply to all parts of the sea that are not
included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in
the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an
archipelagic State. This article does not entail any abridgement of the
freedoms enjoyed by all States in the exclusive economic zone in
accordance with article 58.118

111
112
113
114
115
116
117
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Id.
ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 176 (Cambridge U. Press 2000).
SEALAND, supra note 1.
AUST, supra note 112, at 176.
Members, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/members/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2013).
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
UNCLOS, supra note 88, at arts. 87–89.
Id. at art. 86.
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This provision clearly defines the “High Seas” as a negative space. The
Convention does not define what the high seas are; it defines what the high
seas are not. Utilizing this catch-all method of defining a type of territory, the
framers of this Convention have created an area, the high seas, that encompass
the “rest” of the ocean not otherwise enumerated. Defining the high seas as “all
parts of the sea that are not”119 listed within the proviso, it is possible that the
definition overreaches and incorporates portions of the ocean it ought not
include. Under the overly-broad definition of the high seas, the Convention
further defines various positive rights applicable to navigating the high seas:
(a) freedom of navigation; (b) freedom of overflight; (c) freedom to
lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI; (d) freedom to
construct artificial islands and other installations permitted under
international law, subject to Part VI; (e) freedom of fishing, subject to
the conditions laid down in section 2; (f) freedom of scientific
research, subject to Parts VI and XIII.120

Among these positive rights, these actions allowed on the high seas, is the
freedom to “construct artificial islands” pursuant to Part VI of the
Convention.121 Part VI of the Convention, in Article 80, artificial islands,
installations and structures on the continental shelf, merely imports from the
Exclusive Economic Zone to the Continental Shelf the right of building
artificial islands for natural resource extraction.122 This freedom to construct
artificial islands in the high seas is permitted under international law, and is
transferred over from another portion of the Convention. Considering that the
high seas “shall be reserved for peaceful purposes,”123 coupled with the
Convention’s instruction that, “[n]o State may validly purport to subject any
part of the high seas to its sovereignty,”124 the law laid down by the
Convention is that no sovereign nation may appropriate resources from the
high seas for its own profit. However, the portion of the Convention that the
freedom to construct artificial islands has been transferred from specifically
provides the purpose for constructing artificial islands. Article 56 explains that
artificial island construction is for:
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural
resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to
119
120
121
122
123
124
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Id. at art. 87.
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Id. at arts. 60, 80.
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the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other
activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone,
such as the production of energy from the water, currents and
winds.125

Inherent in these contradictory provisions is the prohibition of nationalizing the
resources of the high seas, while simultaneously expressly granting a freedom
to construct artificial islands pursuant to a provision that allows for mining and
natural resource extraction.
The purpose of the High Seas provisions in the Convention is less likely
concerned with preventing artificial islands and their declarations of
sovereignty, and more likely concerned with protecting lawful seafarers from
piracy. Part VII of the Convention, titled “High Seas,” contains the articles
outlining the rights and reservations of the high seas,126 as well as the articles
related to piracy.127 Among those articles are the definitions for piracy, pirate
ship, and the various duties to cooperate in the repression of piracy, liability of
seizure of pirated goods, and liabilities of piracy of warships.128 Anxious to set
legal boundaries over piracy on an international scale, the framers of the
Convention may have over-reached with regards to the rights and reservations
of the High Seas, specifically the abridged rights related to sovereign
declarations therein.
For many large nations wishing to mine the deep seabed for profitable
resources, the contradiction located inside the minutiae of the Convention may
be a small roadblock to profit, but for Sealand, the contradiction could deny an
equally valuable avenue for statehood. If the Convention expressly enumerates
the freedom to construct artificial islands on the high seas, and a permanent
population finds themselves living on the artificial island (for whatever the
purpose may be), the Convention may additionally provide the means for
declaring the waters surrounding that artificial island no longer a portion of the
negatively carved high seas, but rather a new Exclusive Economic Zone for the
hopeful artificially situated nation.

125
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128

Id. at art. 56.
Id. at arts. 86–99.
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3. Exclusive Economic Zone
The economic benefits of sovereignty for a young nation state cannot be
overstated. Part V of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea describes the
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).129 Within the EEZ, the Convention
establishes first and foremost the “sovereign rights,” or, those rights related to
“the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural
resources.”130 Article 57 demarcates the boundaries of a country’s EEZ to “not
extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of
the territorial sea is measured,”131 which greatly extends a nation’s sovereign
territory beyond the immediate coast. These EEZ’s are highly valuable,
internationally respected boundaries that grant the custodians the opportunity
to capitalize on natural resources they are thought to “own.” The boundaries
are also, however, created by the framers of the Convention, and therefore
subject to the imperfections of any seemingly arbitrarily written legal code.
The “200 nautical mile” extension of territorial sovereignty defined in Article
57 of the Convention is clearly one that grants economic benefits:132 the EEZ
does not restrict the peaceful passage of ships or aircraft,133 which would
signify that the EEZ is meant not only as an economic privilege but also a
barrier to certain rights, sovereignty being one of them.
One provision in the EEZ portion of the Convention, Part 8 of Article 60,
states that, “artificial islands, installations and structures do not possess the
status of islands. They have no territorial sea of their own, and their presence
does not affect the delimitation of the territorial sea, the exclusive economic
zone or the continental shelf.”134 To the extent this condition limits artificial
islands, the natural contextual interpretation would lead the artificial island
limitation to be based on oilrigs and other purely economically minded
structures. Sealand requests exactly what this provision seeks to eliminate: the
status of an island. It is precisely the purpose of Article 60 to deny certain
rights and freedom to artificial islands in their capacity as economic tools for
larger countries. However, the “artificial” basis of Sealand’s structure is
inapplicable to the goals of this article, namely, to exclude foreign oilrigs from
encroaching on the territorial sovereignty of other nations. Article 60 is
129
130
131
132
133
134

Id. at arts. 55–75.
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Id. at art. 57.
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concerned primarily with jurisdiction of the coastal state over any resources
extracted from the artificial islands, and secondarily with the appropriate safety
zones designated by the coastal state.135 The fact that this article is within the
EEZ portion of the Convention altogether is further evidence that the
extraction of natural resources, and the rights connected with that activity, was
the primary issue of concern. Sealand’s founding father is a billionaire,136 and
the main focus of the hopeful platform-nation’s goal of sovereign recognition
has never been economic profit. Attributes of Sealand have never been
economically minded.137 Sealand is unlike an oilrig, whose sole purpose is
natural resource extraction for profit. Sealand’s constitution, coinage,
citizenship paperwork, creation of passports, and ongoing efforts to gain
recognition by the international legal community, are all evidence of Sealand’s
unique nature. If the Convention is to be strictly construed, perhaps Sealand
qualifies as a “geographically disadvantaged state” as per Article 70, which
allows such states “the right to participate, on an equitable basis, in the
exploitation of an appropriate part of the surplus of the living resources of the
exclusive economic zones of coastal States of the same subregion or
region.”138 Bates’ Principality has no desire to infringe on the economic
activities of the United Kingdom; it merely seeks sovereign recognition. The
Exclusive Economic Zones are, in fact, a highly valuable attribute of the
established nations of England, France, and other nations in the area. However,
utilizing this argument as a basis for the non-recognition of Sealand by its
geographically, historically, and economically superior neighbors is both
irrelevant, and to the extent it could ever become relevant, failing.
B. Montevideo Convention
Perhaps the most widely used set of criteria for defining sovereignty is the
Montevideo Convention.139 Following World War I, nations grew eager to
enter into multilateral codifying agreements to broadly promote principles of
interstate relations.140 Adopted at the seventh International Conference of

135

Id.
Hibberd, supra note 21, at 270.
137 William Yardley, Roy Bates, Bigger-Than-Life Founder of a Micronation, Dies at 91, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/14/world/europe/roy-bates-founder-of-sealand-dies-at-91.
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138 UNCLOS, supra note 88, at art. 60.
139 The Montevideo Convention, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.
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American States in 1933, the Convention settled Latin American fears of major
powers intervening in the affairs of Latin American States.141 Sixteen states,
including the United States, adopted the Montevideo Convention.142 The
Montevideo Convention “remains the customary international law standard of
statehood,”143 and its applicability to Sealand’s fight for sovereignty is strong.
Article 1 of the Convention states: “The State as a person of international law
should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a
defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the
other States.”144
1. Sealand Maintains a Permanent Population
First, to qualify as a state in the international legal sphere, a state must have
a permanent population.145 While Roy Bates passed away in October 2012, his
legacy at Sealand lives on.146 In addition to more than 100 citizens,147 a fulltime caretaker currently occupies Sealand, and Michael Bates, Roy Bates’ son,
“expects his descendants to preside over Sealand for many generations to
come.”148 At its most active point, Sealand had “30 to 40 persons permanently
living on the platform.”149 The exceedingly small number of citizens is not
prohibitive of statehood, since “[a]s long as a State’s population is a group of
persons leading a common life and forming a living community, then it
qualifies.”150 “Micro-states” such as Nauru and The Principality of
Lichtenstein (eight square miles and sixty-two square miles respectively) have
both been admitted to the United Nations, yet Nauru delegates its international
powers to Australia, and Lichtenstein to Switzerland.151 Using this logic, it has
been said that the Roman Catholic Church at the Vatican can qualify, while the
citizens of Sealand cannot.152 Because of this reasoning, it has been argued that
the “permanent population” necessary to be considered a state in the
international community must follow the principle of superiorem non
141
142
143
144
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recognoscentes (or, that of external independence).153 The sovereign of
Sealand, some argue, does not have the “effective authority” necessary to
sufficiently fulfill the superiorem non recognoscentes criterion.154 Opponents
of Sealand’s sovereignty also claim the nationals of Sealand have not acquired
the requisite “nationality,” and have associated with each other merely to
support their common “commercial and tax affairs.”155 This is all directly
contrary to the mission of Sealand, however, in that Sealand was “founded on
the principle that any group of people dissatisfied with the oppressive laws and
restrictions of existing nation states may declare independence in any place not
claimed to be under the jurisdiction of another sovereign entity.”156
2. Sealand Has a Defined Territory
Second, a state must possess a defined territory.157 This pre-requisite is as
simple as it is complex, and creates the basis of my argument for Sealand, and
future nations like Sealand’s, sovereignty. Literally interpreted, Sealand’s
defined territory is the platform of Fort Roughs. The platform, measuring
51.2m long, 26.8m wide and 4.3m deep,158 is approximately 1300 square
meters atop,159 and located at Latitude 51.53 N, Longitude 01.28 E,160 it
contains modest living quarters, a kitchen, a chapel and an exercise area within
the cement pillars.161 The extremely small size of a nation is not a prohibitive
feature, since “international law has recognized a host of ‘micro-States,’
entities of exceedingly small size, like Monaco or the Vatican City.”162
However, popular scholarship uses this pre-requisite to repudiate Bates’
nation, in that Sealand’s sovereignty should be “ruled inadmissible under
international law, since territory must be a naturally formed part of the Earth’s
surface to qualify.”163 Territory can be defined many ways, but the opponents
of Bates’ claims utilize the word territory to mean, “a geographical area
153 Guido Acquaviva, Subjects of International Law: A Power-Based Analysis, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 215, 245 n.190 (2005).
154 Id.
155 In re Duchy of Sealand, 80 I.L.R. 683, 688 (1978).
156 Yardley, supra note 137.
157 The Montevideo Convention, supra note 138, at art. 1.
158 Navy Sea Forts, supra note 11.
159 In re Duchy of Sealand, 80 I.L.R. 683, 684 (1978).
160 Terms and Conditions, SEALAND, http://www.sealandgov.org/terms-and-conditions (last visited Dec.
13, 2014).
161 Yardley, supra note 137.
162 BEDERMAN, supra note 143, at 54.
163 Id., at 54.
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included within a particular government’s jurisdiction; the portion of the
earth’s surface that is in a state’s exclusive possession and control.”164 The first
half of this established definition is satisfied by Sealand’s claim to the physical
territory of the platform as well as the governing documents they claim purport
the rights over it. The second half is where Sealand’s detractors find their
footing. German courts have ruled against Sealand in finding that the platform
“is not situated on any fixed point of the surface of the earth. Rather, the
miniature island has been constructed on concrete pillars. The preponderant
view of legal writers is that only a part of the surface of the earth can be
regarded as State territory.”165 The court further explains, “The fact that the
former anti-aircraft platform is firmly connected to the sea-bed by concrete
pillars does not transform the platform into a part of the ‘surface of the earth’
or ‘land territory.’”166 The court strongly concludes on this matter, “only those
parts of the surface of the earth which have come into existence in a natural
way can be recognized as constituting State territory.”167
3. Sealand Has a Government
Third, nations must have a government.168 The meaning of government
particularly called for by the Convention is closely tied to sovereignty, and can
be defined as “the structure of principles and rules determining how a state or
organization is regulated.”169 On September 2, 1975, Roy Bates proclaimed the
Constitution of the Principality of Sealand.170 Before the Constitution, the
government of Sealand was run by the Sealand State Corporation, which gave
a board of Senators complete authority to administer and govern the island.171
The corporation passed the laws and statutes, owned the land and resources of
Sealand, and ensured that Sealand law was accountable to no other nation with
regards to enforcement within the three-nautical mile territory.172 Importantly,
the articles of incorporation declared Sealand a Free Trade Zone so that no
customs, duties, or gaming restrictions could be imposed on the platform.173
When the Constitution of Sealand was adopted, it merely ratified the
164
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incorporation documents of the Sealand State Corporation and made no
practical changes to the application of law in Sealand.174
4. Sealand Has the Capacity to Enter into Relations with Other States
Lastly, nations must be able to “enter into relations with other states.”175
Perhaps the cloudiest of the four requisite conditions for sovereignty in the
Montevideo Convention, Sealand views this as simply satisfied. The strongest
evidence that Sealand has entered into relations with other states is the visit of
a German official to the island-nation back in 1977.176 Coupled with the British
denial of jurisdiction, Sealand has made historically supported arguments for
its international relations.177 Even the embassies of Gabon, Paraguay, Nepal,
Syria, Haiti, Liberia, Honduras, Jamaica, Pakistan, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Jordan,
and Turkey have responded to communications from Sealand representatives
in their official capacity regarding investment opportunities.178 Finally, as one
scholar has acknowledged, “Sealand’s citizens have managed to travel into
various countries by presenting Sealand passports.”179
The Montevideo Convention proposes the declaratory theory of
recognition.180 Unlike the constitutive theory of recognition, which mandates
recognition from already-existing states to create a new “state,” the declaratory
theory is far more inclusive.181 The constitutive theory raises many problems
for new and developing nations, many of which make it difficult to ever
actually accede to official statehood in the “Family of Nations.”182 Constitutive
theory followers are essentially recommending that recognition by pre-existing
states become a fifth and necessary element of statehood in the Montevideo
Convention.183 With a constitutive theory of recognition, Sealand would face
extremely difficult measures on its path to sovereignty. Which, and how many,
already existing countries would have to recognize Sealand before it could join
the “family?” If no one yet recognized Sealand, could neighboring nations,
174
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such as England or Germany, violate the Charter of the United Nations and
threaten or use “force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of” Sealand?184 For these reasons, among others, the Montevideo Convention
utilizes the declaratory theory of recognition.185 Article 3 of the Convention
states:
The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by
the other States. Even before recognition the State has the right to
defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its conservation
and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to
legislate upon its interests, administer its services, and to define the
jurisdiction and competence of its courts.186

In just her first few decades, Sealand has done most of these things. Despite
lacking recognition from other states, Sealand has defended her independence
when Roy and Michael Bates allegedly defensively fired munitions towards
British boats;187 Sealand has attempted multiple economic endeavors to build a
treasury for the nation, including capitalizing from safe data storage supply;188
Sealand has intricately laid out a Constitution with cabinets of administration
and governmental organization;189 and Sealand has defined its nautically
territorial jurisdiction, and made use of its courts.190 Article 6 of the
Montevideo Convention further reinforces the declaratory theory of
recognition by providing, “[t]he recognition of a State merely signifies that the
State which recognizes it accepts the personality of the other with all the rights
and duties determined by international law. Recognition is unconditional and
irrevocable.”191 The Montevideo Convention utilizes the declaratory theory of
recognition rather than the constitutive, and “a head-count will show that an
overwhelming majority of international law experts subscribe to the
declaratory theory.”192 Recognition by other states, it follows, is sufficient for
sovereignty, not necessary.
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C. Secession
A strong argument against Sealand obtaining statehood is the general
international opposition of secession.193 Secession is “the process or act of
withdrawing, especially from a religious or political association,”194 and
usually refers to separatist movements. Since Sealand’s argument for statehood
could in some circumstances be fairly accurately described as secession from
England, popular arguments against secession are not out of place with
reference to Sealand’s case at hand. Famous cases of attempted secession in
recent history include the Basques in Spain, the dissolution of former
Yugoslavia, the Kurds in the Middle East, and the Quebecois secession
movement in Canada.195 The Quebecois case illuminates the problems with
secession, and traditionally, the only two ways the international community
will accept a secession attempt.196 Generally, secession is recognized only
when a decision to secede is “freely determined by a people,”197 or, “if,
following an armed conflict, national boundaries are redrawn as part of a peace
settlement.”198 For a decision to be freely determined by a people, it must be
agreed upon by a “cross-section” of the population from both the group
seceding, and the group being seceded from.199 In the Quebec case, neither prerequisite for secession is likely to be fulfilled, since the remaining provinces in
Canada do not wish to see Quebec go, and armed conflict is highly unlikely.200
In late 2014, Scotland entertained a referendum to secede the United
Kingdom.201 With motivation stemming from “currency, the monarchy, the
armed forces, North Sea oil revenues, pension rights and much more,”202
Scotland attempted to regain independence from the United Kingdom.203
Scotland called its people to vote on the question, “Should Scotland be an

193

DONAH SHELTON, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 379–400
(Oxford U. Press) (2013).
194 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1470 (9th ed. 2009).
195 BEDERMAN, supra note 143, at 56.
196 SHELTON, supra note 193, at 391.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 van der Vyver, supra note 192, at 11.
201 Scottish
referendum: Scotland votes ‘No’ to independence, BRIT. BROAD. CORP.,
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-29270441 (last updated Sept. 19, 2014, 10:51 ET).
202 Nick Robinson, Scottish independence: Does it take two to separate?, BRIT. BROAD. CORP.,
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-16468462 (last updated Jan. 9, 2012, 8:47 ET).
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independent country?”204 Although “No” won the vote fifty-five percent to
forty-five percent,205 that the referendum was entertained at all is a signal that
independence is still a major consideration of both established and
unrecognized nations alike.
In Sealand’s case, this would require a general consensus of England to
agree to the secession of Sealand, in addition to Sealand’s obvious desire to
separate. When England avoided tearing down Fort Roughs in order to avoid
the cost of the demolition,206 and when British courts evaded jurisdiction over
the platform in the 1960’s,207 an unbiased party could reasonably conclude that
England would not oppose Sealand’s secession. Unlike the highly documented
separatist movements listed above, England would lose a minuscule amount of
economic, cultural, or social value as a result of Sealand’s successful
independence. With regards to the second type of secession recognized by the
international community, it is highly unlikely that Sealand would ever
willingly enter into conflict with the military organizations of any of its
neighboring nations. Outside of the two circumstances listed above,
international courts have found three special circumstances for the right to
secession.208 The special circumstances apply to categories of people within
three groups: “(a) those under colonial domination or foreign occupation; (b)
peoples subject to ‘alien subjugation, domination or exploitation outside a
colonial context;’ and, possibly, (c) a people ‘blocked from the meaningful
exercise of its right to self-determination internally.’”209 A cursory glance of
these three special circumstances reveals that they likely don’t apply to
Sealand’s case. Upon closer inspection of the issue, however, it appears that an
application of the declarative theory of recognition fits perfectly with
Sealand’s absence from this list of special circumstances. Sealand has not been
prejudiced or interfered with for decades, and it is because their regular
interaction with England is exceedingly small that they deserve sovereignty.
The amount of political, economic, and social disruption both the United
Kingdom and Sealand would experience is so negligible that the popular
arguments against traditional statehood secession do not apply.
204 Andrew Black, Scottish independence: SNP accepts call to change referendum question, BRIT. BROAD.
CORP., http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-21245701 (last updated Jan. 30, 2013, 7:59
ET).
205 BRIT. BROAD. CORP., supra note 201.
206 Dennis, supra note 20.
207 Transcript of Court Decision, supra note 33.
208 van der Vyver, supra note 192, at 12.
209 Id.
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The international legal community’s distaste for secession rests on several
grounds, none of which apply to Sealand and its quest for legitimately
recognized statehood. The two most applicable arguments against the
“disjunction of territorial frontiers” are the concerns that, “a multiplicity of
economically non-viable states will further contribute to a decline of the living
standards in the world community,” alongside, movement of people within
plural societies “across territorial divides” has greatly destroyed ethnic,
cultural or religious homogeneity in regions where it might have existed in
earlier times.210 The simple fact of the matter is that these fears of diving
societies and creating the potential for harmful segregation of minorities and
future poor treatment of marginalized people is unfounded with regards to
Sealand. Additionally, Sealand has a very low likelihood of becoming one of
the economically non-viable states feared of by this argument.211
IV. ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY OF SEALAND
Aside from the aforementioned legal arguments for artificial islands’
sovereign recognition, there are several practical and logical arguments in
favor of Sealand. This section discusses the environmental arguments for
sovereign recognition of artificial land. With the support of existing man-made
territories as miniature case studies, this section bolsters the case that naturally
occurring land is not the sole type of property with applicable sovereign
qualities. Battery Park City in New York, New York, and the opulent and
artistically sculpted Palm, Jumeirah, and World Islands in Dubai, U.A.E. are
displayed as proven, working forms of artificially created property attached to
sovereign nations. Finally, rising sea-levels and other potentially catastrophic
environmental factors are posited as latent threats to hundreds of thousands of
island-dwelling people, making the case stronger not only for Sealand, but for
instances where Sealand could serve one day as valuable precedent in
sovereign recognition of artificial islands.
A. Artificial Islands, and the Case for Their Statehood
The case for Sealand is actually an argument for future nations similarly
situated to Sealand. Man-made islands, groups of people forced out of their
home nations due to over-crowding and over-population, and a rising sea level
210

SHELTON, supra note 193, at 392.
Garfinkel, supra note 47 (explaining that Roy Bates was a billionaire and was willing to put as much
money necessary into the country of Sealand. Additionally, multiple economic enterprises were attempted in
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making many locations on this planet uninhabitable in the coming years, are all
very real situations that our and future generations will be forced to deal with.
One potential solution could be to migrate to artificially created islands. It is
not unrealistic to posit this solution, as people already inhabit artificial land
across the globe. From the floating villages of Cambodia and the commercially
dredged Palm Islands in Dubai, to the Bates family and their home on the
Maunsell Fort roughly six nautical miles off the British coast, people are living
on artificial territory. When forced out of their homes, people may wish to one
day replicate these societies and create a new home, build a new island, inhabit
a new platform. These are the groups of people who will benefit from
Sealand’s sovereign recognition.
Man-made islands are inhabited all over the world, from Manhattan to the
Middle East.212 In the luxurious Palm, Jumeirah, and World Islands off
Dubai’s coast, multi-millionaire and billionaire residents live in luxurious
mansions and estates accessible only by their yachts.213 These islands are all,
of course, man made.214 The Palm Islands alone took two hundred ten million
cubic meters of dredged rock, sand, and limestone.215 With private beach-front
properties and various condominium designs to choose from, the opulent
residential community on the Palm Jumeirah encompasses 49,000 square
meters.216 The entire development boasts state of the art malls, homes, and
yacht clubs.217
Manhattan, New York planned the development by expanding the island
artificially rather than developing through separate islands.218 In an effort to
revitalize New York City’s poor economy in the 1980’s, former Mayor of New
York, Ed Koch, entered into agreement to fill in the dilapidated piers with the
212 Palm Jumeirah, NAKHEEL, http://www.nakheel.com/en/communities/palm-jumeirah (last visited Nov.
3, 2013); HUGH L. CAREY BATTERY PARK CITY AUTH., ANNUAL REVIEW 1999 1 (2000), available at http://
batteryparkcity.org/new/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/1999.pdf.
213 Palm Jumeirah, supra note 212; Richard Spencer, The World is sinking: Dubai islands falling into the
sea, THE TELEGRAPH, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/dubai/8271643/The-World-issinking-Dubai-islands-falling-into-the-sea.html, (Jan. 20, 2011, 9:30 PM).
214 Id.
215 25 of Mankind’s Greatest Engineering Achievements, CABLE NEWS NETWORK (July 5, 2013), http://
www.cnn.com/2013/07/04/travel/engineering-feats.
216 Nakheel Announces the Launch of Palm Residence on Palm Jumeirah, NAKHEEL, http://www.nakheel.
com/en/media/news/nakheel-announces-the-launch-of-palm-residence-on-palm-jumeirah, (last visited Nov. 3,
2013).
217 Palm Jumeirah, supra note 204. Palm Views East and West, NAKHEEL, http://www.nakheel.com/en/
your-dream-home/palm-views-east-and-west (last visited Oct. 25, 2014).
218 HUGH L. CAREY BATTERY PARK CITY AUTH., supra note 213, at 1.

LYON GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

1/22/2015 12:31 PM

THE PRINCIPALITY OF SEALAND

665

excavated rock and from the World Trade Center.219 A public benefit
corporation created what is now known as Battery Park City, and the island of
Manhattan gained approximately ninety-two acres of prime real estate on its
southwest corner along the Hudson River.220 Today, Battery Park City is home
to a public high school, thousands of New Yorkers, more than thirty acres of
parks, and a 1.2-mile esplanade with amazing Hudson River views.221 New
York is not a new canvas for the concept of artificial land additions. In the
early 1900’s, when land reclamation was a popular idea, an architect named
Dr. T. Kennard Thompson published an architectural plan in Popular Science
to fill in the East River and connect Manhattan to Brooklyn.222 Additionally,
the architect wished to extend Manhattan to Governor’s Island, and construct
new islands attached to Staten Island and Jersey City.223 Of course, none of
these architectural renderings ever saw the reality that Battery Park City did,
but the ambitious endeavor of expanding populated land to accommodate a
constantly growing, changing world, is no new concept.
Both the Palm Islands and Battery Park City were created as extensions of
these coastal metropolises in order to add vibrancy to the community and,
more importantly, provide economic stimuli.224 Battery Park was created
partially to provide an economic boom to the downtown economy during the
1968 recession. With a debt of $6 billion, New York was in dire need of
financial assistance, and Battery Park City answered the call.225 The Palm
Islands also found their creation at the hands of economically minded
government officials in the United Arab Emirates. With vast expanses of
uninhabited desert and beachfront land, the U.A.E. could have afforded to
build the new residential, commercial, and retail developments inland, or on
pre-existing land.226 However, the developers realized the potential to
capitalize on man-made islands within eyesight of the coast proved to be a
much more financially beneficial option. Yes, Battery Park City and the Palm
219 Interview by Stephen E. Greer with Ed Koch, Former Mayor of the City of New York, in New York,
N.Y. (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k9E5n712B4U [hereinafter Interview].
220 HUGH L. CAREY BATTERY PARK CITY AUTH., supra note 212, at 2.
221 Id.
222 Jessica Dailey, The 1916 Proposal to Expand Manhattan by 50 Square Miles, CURBED (Nov. 4, 2013),
http://ny.curbed.com/archives/2013/11/04/the_1916_proposal_to_expand_manhattan_by_50_square_miles.ph
p.
223 Id.
224 See generally HUGH L. CAREY BATTERY PARK CITY AUTH., supra note 212; Jumeirah, supra note 212.
225 Interview, supra note 219.
226 See generally CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, United Arab Emirates, in THE WORLD FACTBOOK,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ae.html (last updated June 23, 2014).
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Islands in Dubai provide full-time housing for thousands of people, but were it
not for the economic benefits of building these new landmasses, it is doubtful
the projects ever would have come to fruition.
The exercise of municipal, district, and even federal jurisdiction over these
man-made land additions is unquestioned. Existing American laws apply in
Battery Park, and crimes can be committed on the Palm Islands with regards to
the government in the U.A.E. However, the precedent that seemingly disallows
the sovereignty of Sealand because it is not a naturally occurring extension of
the earth’s surface would disagree. The German administrative court held
against Sealand’s statehood when it concluded, “only those parts of the surface
of the earth which have come into existence in a natural way can be
recognized as constituting State territory.”227 Battery Park City is not the
natural build-up of landmass near the mouth of the Hudson River, and the
Palm Islands were certainly not naturally formed into the beautiful shapes of
palm fronds and globes from the tidal currents in the Persian Gulf.
Nevertheless, they are both considered very much a part of state territory.
Granted, Sealand is not attempting to be considered a part of England’s state
territory, it is attempting to be recognized as its own state territory. The
definition of “State territory” according to the German administrative court is
flawed either way.
Additionally, it is argued that Sealand’s population does not fulfill the
requisite superiorem non recognoscentes principle. 228 The commercial appeal
of a man-made territory cannot be a deterrent to statehood. The “effective
authority” of a nation is no less diminished, and were it the case that Sealand
housed permanent residents in the capacity that Battery Park or the Palm
Islands did, the economic benefits of its situation would no longer be
considered a factor in the decision of sovereignty. When Battery Park City
alleviated some of New York City’s $6 Billion debt in the 1980’s,229 the
economic value of the artificial island extension was viewed as an attribute,
rather than a detriment. When the U.A.E. government approved the plans for
the opulent residential and retail communities on the Palm, Jumeirah, and
World islands, no one complained that the almost purely financial impetus for
their creation failed to meet the terms of a superiorem non recognoscentes.

227
228
229

In re Duchy of Sealand, 80 I.L.R. 683, 685 (emphasis added).
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Unlike the previous examples, the future holds promise for artificial islands
that will not be connected to their motherlands, and that will serve purposes
unlike any seen before. Peter Thiel, co-founder of PayPal, has co-founded
another innovative initiative, the Seasteading Institute.230 Along with economic
theorist Patri Friedman, grandson of Nobel Prize winner Milton Friedman, the
two are attempting to create floating communities on which small societies can
experiment with pioneering forms of governmental, political, and economic
infrastructure.231 The mission statement, “[T]he Seasteading Institute is a
nonprofit 501(c)(3), working to enable seasteading communities—floating
cities—which will allow the next generation of pioneers to test new ideas for
government. The most successful can then inspire change in governments
around the world,”232 reveals multiple facets of the Institute relevant to the
sovereignty of artificial lands.
The Institute’s mission is to build floating cities, more similar to large,
navigable ships than stationary artificial landmasses.233 As a moving,
transportable vessel, the floating communities would more closely resemble
ships, thus requiring compliance with Article 92 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea.234 This section of the Convention outlines
the requirement of flying nation-flags in order to signal allegiance to a
sovereign.235 Unlike Sealand, whose goal is to declare itself an independent
nation, the Seasteading Institute attempts to fly the flags of already existing
nations on its floating societies.236 However, the Institute doesn’t discount the
idea of independent sovereignty altogether; the reasoning behind the move to
fly the flags of existing nations is strategic.237 In order to eschew the
regulations and standards that coincide with flying the flag of certain larger,
more developed countries,238 flying a flag from a country with loose
registration standards, or open registry, allows the greatest potential for

230 Why the World Needs Seasteading, THE SEASTEADING INST., http://www.seasteading.org/about/ (last
visited Sept. 9, 2014).
231 Id.
232 Welcome to the Seasteading Institute, THE SEASTEADING INST., http://www.seasteading.org/ (last
visited Oct. 25, 2014).
233 Floating City Project, THE SEASTEADING INST., http://www.seasteading.org/comprehensive-seasteadproject/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2014).
234 UNCLOS, supra note 88, at art. 92.
235 Id., at art. 91.
236 Law and Policy, THE SEASTEADING INST., http://www.seasteading.org/law-and-policy/ (last visited
Sept. 9, 2014).
237 See id.
238 Id.
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autonomy while adrift on the high seas.239 However, flying a flag on open
registry carries both a historical stigma240 and high potential for legal
conflict.241 It does appear that the solution of flying flags on open registry is a
temporary solution to a permanent problem: how do we claim sovereignty and
live under a self-created government on artificial land?
The Seasteading Institute also proposes its goal of allowing the “next
generation of pioneers to test new ideas for government.”242 This
experimentation of innovative government forms is akin to Sealand, with a
purpose. By providing a location where inventive political theorists can test
new forms of governance, and economists can likewise experiment with new
forms of capital infrastructure, the Seasteading Institute has potential to be an
extremely valuable Petri dish for future structures of society. However,
forming new governments aboard these floating cities will likely involve
exceeding the legal boundaries of current governments. Sovereign recognition,
and therefore independence and immunity from restriction of other
governments, is necessary for places like the islands the Seasteading Institute
proposes to build.
B. Environmental Factors Forcing Artificial Island Construction
Rising sea levels threaten the livelihood of the Maldives now more than
ever. This tiny archipelago nation exists, in its entirety, no more than six feet
above sea level.243 Recent research on elevated oceanic temperatures has led
many to believe that the earth is in fact changing.244 More than thirty years
ago, Polar Studies scientist J. H. Mercer was already positing the results of
global climate change when he concluded that when, “global consumption of
fossil fuels continues to grow at its present rate, atmospheric CO2 content will
double in about 50 years,” and that this could result in “rapid deglaciation of

239
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243 Maldives Country Profile, BRIT. BROAD. CORP., http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia12651486 (last updated Oct. 22, 2013, 7:06 AM).
244 See generally Justin Gillis, Timing a Rise in Sea Level, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2013, at D6, available at
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West Antarctica, leading to a 5 m[eter] rise in sea level.”245 By this metric, the
Maldives would, at its highest point, exist at roughly eight feet below sea level.
Sea-level science is still highly speculative, but more recent studies have
shown that “continuing on our current path would mean locking in a long-term
sea level rise of 23 feet,”246 which would obliterate coastal cities on every
continent. The speculative nature of climate change means scientists are unsure
if these drastic sea-level elevations are likely to happen in the next hundred
years, or one thousand years.247 Despite this uncertainty, many communities on
earth, from the islands nation of the Maldives to highly populated cities like
New York, remain threatened by the potential increase in sea levels. Luckily
for coastal cities, the adaptation could be to move inland. This reactive
measure may not be possible, however, for the archipelagic states of the South
Pacific Ocean. In addition to the Maldives, the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu,
Kiribati, and Tokelau are all home to hundreds of thousands of people, and
none of their islands are more than three meters above current sea levels.248
Exacerbating the problem on some similarly situated islands, the portions of
the land that do rise significantly higher above sea level are comprised of
rugged, high-relief volcanic terrain that focuses the populations down “along
low coastal fringes.”249 Rising sea levels are not the only threat for coastal
communities and small islands. Explosive population growth,
overdevelopment, pollution, and other environmental factors could play
devastating roles in the destruction of naturally occurring land.250
The case for Sealand is, after all, an argument for the future of people in
perilous situations. Whether it be rising sea levels, overpopulation, or any
number of other environmental factors that force people out or off their land,
one solution could be artificial land production. Unlike the Bates family, who
settle on an already constructed platform, humans could potentially construct
their own, new, inhabitable land. Like Rousseau’s Social Contract
philosophizes, groups of people who eventually break off and inhabit new land
will likely want to govern their own communities.251 And if these new

245 J. H. Mercer, West Antarctic Ice Sheet and CO Greenhouse Effect: A Threat of Disaster, 271 NATURE
2
321, 321 (1978).
246 Gillis, supra note 244.
247 Id.
248 Stephen P. Leatherman & Nancy Beller-Simms, Sea-Level Rise and Small Island States: An Overview,
24 J. COASTAL RES. (Special Issue) 1, 2 (1997).
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 ROUSSEAU, supra note 57, at 170.

LYON GALLEYSPROOFS2

670

1/22/2015 12:31 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

societies, bounding forth into the aquatic frontier satisfy the qualifications
defined in the Montevideo Convention,252 their plea for sovereign recognition
should be accepted.
CONCLUSION
It is perhaps a far off chance for the Principality of Sealand to ever gain
recognition in the international legal community as a sovereign nation, with all
of the rights and freedoms that coincide with the valuable status. Sealand’s
case for this independent recognition of statehood is ambitious, and likely
more valuable as a case study to bolster support for future artificial islands, and
their goals of similar recognition. The ideological implications of granting
Sealand their requested status are nearly as far reaching as the practical ones, it
would open the floodgates for pioneering social entrepreneurs. For better or
worse, the barriers to the final, habitable (for the time being) frontier would be
unfastened and a new era of social experimentation could occur. If and when
the day comes that mankind requires more physical space to house its
members, the success of independent, self-reliant societies would depend
heavily on the path carved out before them, the lessons learned from the
successes and failures of those new nations forging the way. The potential to
amalgamate the flourishing qualities of modern society, as well as the
opportunity to eliminate the flawed ones, would allow artificially created
islands and landmasses to house new countries.
The United Nations’ various treaties and conventions have successfully
guided the international community for decades, but with the ever-changing
global setting it resides in, the codified commonly accepted “rules” are bound
to bend and adapt. Concepts like territorial sovereignty and exclusive
economic zones were defined by the UN in an era where artificial islands were
neither existent nor necessary. Now, the environmental changes currently
affecting the planet may dictate a new outlook on how we define “country” and
“state.” The cut off point of admissibility to international recognition should no
longer be “naturally-occurring” land, and should no longer be solely concerned
with compliance of laws rooted in out-of-date history. Changing these laws,
norms, and prerequisites is a bold request, but these laws are elastic, and the
international legal community is as well. Roy Bates, with his radio station and
rebellious spirit, probably never imagined the future implications of his
Principality and its quest for acknowledgment. However, the spirit of his
252
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country and its motto, “E Mare Libertas,” is the perfect rallying cry for the
expansion of sovereignty’s meaning in today’s world. From the sea, freedom,
Bates requested. Perhaps the international legal community should note his call
to arms. One day, they may have to.
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